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Abstract. In this paper, we construct a complexity-based morphospace wherein
one can study systems-level properties of conscious and intelligent systems based
on information-theoretic measures. The axes of this space labels three distinct
complexity types, necessary to classify conscious machines, namely, autonomous,
cognitive and social complexity. In particular, we use this morphospace to compare
biologically conscious agents ranging from bacteria, bees, C. elegans, primates and
humans with artificially intelligence systems such as deep networks, multi-agent
systems, social robots, AI applications such as Siri and computational systems as
Watson. Given recent proposals to synthesize consciousness, a generic complexity-
based conceptualization provides a useful framework for identifying defining features
of distinct classes of conscious and synthetic systems. Based on current clinical scales
of consciousness that measure cognitive awareness and wakefulness, this article takes
a perspective on how contemporary artificially intelligent machines and synthetically
engineered life forms would measure on these scales. It turns out that awareness
and wakefulness can be associated to computational and autonomous complexity
respectively. Subsequently, building on insights from cognitive robotics, we examine
the function that consciousness serves, and argue the role of consciousness as an
evolutionary game-theoretic strategy. This makes the case for a third type of
complexity necessary for describing consciousness, namely, social complexity. Having
identified these complexity types, allows for a representation of both, biological and
synthetic systems in a common morphospace. A consequence of this classification
is a taxonomy of possible conscious machines. In particular, we identify four types
of consciousness, based on embodiment: (i) biological consciousness, (ii) synthetic
consciousness, (iii) group consciousness (resulting from group interactions), and (iv)
simulated consciousness (embodied by virtual agents within a simulated reality).
This taxonomy helps in the investigation of comparative signatures of consciousness
across domains, in order to highlight design principles necessary to engineer conscious
machines. This is particularly relevant in the light of recent developments at the
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crossroads of cognitive neuroscience, biomedical engineering, artificial intelligence and
biomimetics.
Keywords: Consciousness, Brain Networks, Artificial Intelligence, Synthetic Biology,
Cognitive Robotics, Complex Systems.
1. Introduction
Can one construct a taxonomy of consciousness based on evidence from clinical
neuroscience, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive robotics? In
this paper we explore current biologically motivated metrics of consciousness. In view
of these metrics, we show how contemporary AI and synthetic systems measure on
homologous scales. In what follows, we refer to a phenomenological description of
consciousness. In other words, that which can be described in epistemically objective
terms, even though aspects of the problem of consciousness may require an ontologically
subjective description. Drawing from what is known about the phenomenology of
consciousness in biological systems, we build a homologous argument for artificial,
collective and simulated systems. For example, in clinical diagnosis of disorders of
consciousness, two widely used scales are patient awareness and wakefulness (also
referred to as arousal), both of which can be assessed using neurophysiological recordings
[57], [55]. We will use these scales to construct a morphospace of consciousness.
The origin of the concept of a morphospace comes from comparative anatomy
and paleobiology, where either quantitative measures or principal components from a
clustering methods allow locating given items in a metric-like space, but it can also
involve a relative position approach, as the one we will follow here. A related concept of
the so-called theoretical morphospace, has also been defined in formal terms, as an N -
dimensional geometric hyperspace produced by systematically varying the parameter
values associated to a given (usually geometric) set of traits [65]. More recently,
morphospaces have been used in the study of complex systems, linguistics and biology
[17], [72], [81]. A morphospace commits one to embodiment or form. In the context of
consciousness, embodiment can be both, physical and virtual. Hence, a morphospace
serves as a useful tool to gain insights on design principles and evolutionary constraints,
when looking across a large class of systems (or species) that display complex variations
in traits. For the problem of consciousness, we construct this morphospace based on
three distinct complexity types. These considerations suggest an embodiment-based
taxonomy of consciousness [8].
For practical reasons, many experimental paradigms testing consciousness are
designed for humans or higher-order primates (see [19], [53], [92] for an overview of
the field). In this article, we argue that metrics commonly associated to biological
consciousness can also be meaningfully used for conceptualizing behaviors of synthetic
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and artificially intelligent systems. This is insightful not only for understanding
parallels between biological and potential synthetic consciousness, but more importantly
for unearthing design principles necessary for building biomimetic technology that
could potentially acquire consciousness. As evidenced by several historical precedents,
bio-inspired design thinking has been at the core of some of the greatest scientific
breakthroughs. For instance, early attempts at aviation in the 19th century were
inspired by studying flight mechanics in birds and insects (the term aviation itself is
derived from the Latin ”avis” for ”bird”). In fact, biological flight mechanisms are
so sophisticated that their biomimetic implementations are still being actively studied
within the field of soft robotics [66]. However, it so happened that rather than coming
around to mimicking nature exactly, humanity learnt the basic laws of aerodynamics
based on observations from nature and looked for other embodiments of those principles.
This in fact, led to the invention of the modern aircraft by the Wright brothers in 1903,
leading to a completely new way to build machines that fly than those that exactly
mimic nature.
Another paradigm-changing example of bio-inspired thinking leading to modern day
technological innovation can be seen in artificial neural networks, which dates back to the
1930s with the first model of neural networks by Nicolas Rashevsky [76], followed by the
seminal work of Walter Pitts and Warren McCulloch in 1943 [64] and Frank Rosenblatt’s
perceptron in 1958 [78]. The field began as a modest attempt to understand cognition
and brain function. Eventually, with the use of analytical tools from statistical physics,
those simple formal models paved the way to understanding associative memory and
other emergent cognitive phenomena [47]. Even though artificial neural networks did
not quite solve the problem of how the brain works, they led to the discovery of brain-
inspired computing technologies such as deep learning systems and powerful technologies
for computational intelligence such as IBM’s Watson. These machines process massive
volumes of data and are built for intensive computational tasks that the brain is not even
designed for. In that spirit, the next frontier is understanding the governing principles
of biological consciousness and its various embodiments, which could potentially lead to
the growth of next-generation sentient technologies. Recent work in this direction can
be found in [84].
Metrics of consciousness are also the right tools to quantitatively study how human
intelligence differs from current machine intelligence. Once again, it is instructive to take
a historical perspective on human intelligence as laid out by one of the founders of AI,
Allen Newell in 1994 in his seminal work, ”Unified Theories of Cognition” [70]. Newell
proposed the following thirteen criteria necessary for building human-level cognitive
architectures:
• Behave flexibly as a function of the environment
• Exhibit adaptive (rational, goal-oriented) behavior
• Operate in real-time
• Operate in a rich, complex, detailed environment (that is, perceive an immense amount
of changing detail, use vast amounts of knowledge, and control a motor system of many
The Morphospace of Consciousness 4
degrees of freedom)
• Use symbols and abstractions
• Use language, both natural and artificial
• Learn from the environment and from experience
• Acquire capabilities through development
• Operate autonomously, but within a social community
• Be self-aware and have a sense of self
• Be realizable as a neural system
• Be constructible by an embryological growth process
• Arise through evolution
Current AI architectures still do not meet all these criteria. On the other hand, though
Newell did not discuss consciousness back then, the above criteria are very relevant
in the light of current research on neural mechanisms of consciousness [53]. While
Newell’s criteria list signatures that are the consequence of human intelligence, for
consciousness it is more useful to have a list of functional criteria that results in the
process of consciousness. In this article, we shall discuss prospective functional criteria
for consciousness.
2. Biological Consciousness: Insights from Clinical Neuroscience
We begin this discussion reviewing clinical scales used for assessing consciousness
in patients with disorders of consciousness. In subsequent sections, we generalize
complexity measures pertinent to these biological scales and discuss how current
synthetic systems measure up on these.
2.1. Clinical Consciousness and its Disorders
In patients with disorders of consciousness ranging from coma, locked-in syndrome
to those in vegetative states, levels of consciousness are assessed through a battery
of behavioral tests as well as physiological recordings. Cognitive awareness in
patients is assessed by testing several cognitive functionalities using behavioral and
neurophysiological (fMRI or EEG) protocols [57]. Assessments of wakefulness/arousal
in patients are based on metabolic markers (in cases where reporting is not possible) such
as glucose uptake in the brain, captured using PET scans. More generally, in [57] and
[55], awareness and wakefulness have been proposed as a two dimensional operational
definition of clinical consciousness, shown in figure 1 below. While awareness concerns
higher and lower-order cognitive functions enabling complex behavior; wakefulness
results from biochemical homeostatic mechanisms regulating survival drives and is
clinically measured in terms of glucose metabolism in the brain. In fact, in all known
organic life forms, biochemical arousal is a necessary precursor supporting the hardware
necessary for cognition. In turn, evolution has shaped cognition in such a way so as to
support the organism’s basic survival (using wakefulness/arousal) as well as higher-order
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drives (using awareness) associated to cooperation and competition in a multi-agent
environment [96]. Awareness and wakefulness thus taken together, form the clinical
markers of consciousness.
Figure 1. Clinical scales of consciousness. A clustering of disorders of
consciousness in humans represented on scales of awareness and wakefulness. Adapted
from [55]. In neurophysiological recordings, signatures of awareness have been
found in cortico-thalamic activity, whereas wakefulness corresponds to activity in
the brainstem and associated systems [57], [55]. Abbreviated legends: VS/UWS
(vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness state) [56]; MCS(+/-) (minimally conscious
state plus/minus), EMCS (emergence from minimally conscious state) [25].
This clinical definition of consciousness enables a practical classification of closely
associated states/disorders of consciousness into clusters on a bivariate scale with
awareness and wakefulness on orthogonal axes. Under healthy conditions, these two
levels are almost linearly correlated, as in conscious wakefulness (high arousal and
high awareness) or in deep sleep (low arousal and low awareness). In pathological
states, wakefulness without awareness can be observed in the vegetative state [57],
while transiently reduced awareness is observed following seizures [22]. Patients in the
minimally conscious state show intermittent and limited non-reflexive and purposeful
behavior [37], [36], whereas patients with hemispatial neglect display reduced awareness
of stimuli contralateral to the side where brain damage has occurred [73].
The question is how can one generalize wakefulness/arousal and awareness for
non-biological systems in order to obtain homologous scales of consciousness that can
be mapped to artificial systems? As noted above, wakefulness/arousal results from
autonomous homeostatic mechanisms necessary for the self-preservation of an organism’s
germ line in a given environment. In other words, arousal results from self-sustaining
life processes necessary for basic survival, whereas awareness refers to functionalities
pertaining to estimating or predicting states of the world and optimizing the agent’s
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own actions with respect to those states. If biological consciousness as we know it,
is a synergy between metabolic and cognitive processes, the question one can ask is
how should this insight be extended to conceive a functional notion of consciousness in
synthetic systems? One way of doing so might be generalizing wakefulness/arousal
to scales of autonomous functioning and awareness to scales of computational or
informational processes.
2.2. Measures of Consciousness
Specific measures of autonomy and computation/information processing have been
discussed in psychometric [99] respectively neurophysiological studies [101]. However,
applying these measures to artificial systems and comparing those values to biological
systems is not always so straightforward (due to completely different processing
substrates). Nonetheless, these measures offer a first step in this direction. For example,
[99] introduce an ”Index of Autonomous Functioning”, tested on healthy human subjects
(via psychometric questionnaires). This index aims to assess psychological ownership,
interest-taking and susceptibility to external controls. This is similar to the concept
of volition (or agency), introduced in the cognitive neurosciences [40], which seeks
to determine the neural correlates of self-regulation, referring to actions regulated by
internal drives rather than exclusively driven by external contingencies.
Attempts to quantify awareness have appeared in [29], discussed in the context of
a unified psychological theory of self-functioning. However, in consciousness research,
a measure of awareness that has gained a lot of traction is integrated information [94]
(often denoted as Φ). This is an information-theoretic complexity measure. It was
first introduced in neuroscience as a measure applicable to neural networks. Based on
mutual information, Φ has been touted as a correlate of consciousness [94]. Integrated
information is loosely defined as the quantity of information generated by a network
as a whole, due to its causal dynamical interactions, over and above the information
generated independently by the disjoint sum of its parts. As a complexity measure, Φ
seeks to operationalize the intuition that complexity arises from simultaneous integration
and differentiation of the network’s structure and dynamics, thus enabling the emergence
of the system’s collective states. The interplay between integration and differentiation
generates information that is highly diversified yet integrated, creating patterns of high
complexity. Following initial proposals [91], [93], [94], several approaches have been
developed to compute integrated information [3], [11], [14], [15], [12], [13], [18], [20],
[21], [39], [71], [75], [90], [100].
Notably the work of [15] is of particular significance in the context of this discussion
as it develops large-scale network computations of integrated information, applied to the
human brain’s connectome data. The human connectome data consists of structural
connectivity of white matter fiber tracts in the cerebral cortex, extracted using diffusion
spectrum imaging and tractography [41], [46] (see [4], [16], [5] for neurodynamical models
used on this network). Compared to a randomly re-wired network, it was seen that
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the particular topology of the human brain generates greater information complexity
for all allowed couplings associated to the network’s attractor states, as well as to its
non-stationary dynamical states [15]. However, the formulation of Φ is not specific to
biological systems and can equally well be applied to artificial dynamical systems and
serves as a measure of their computational or information processing complexity (which
we interpret as cognitive complexity or awareness in biological agents).
3. Synthetic Consciousness: Insights from Synthetic Biology and Artificial
Intelligence
Although our understanding of natural systems can be strongly constrained by
experimental limitations, the potential for exploring synthetic counterparts provides
a unique research window. It has been suggested that artificial simulations, in silico
implementations and engineered alternatives can actually be much needed to understand
the origins of evolutionary dynamics, including cognitive transitions [83]. What can be
achieved in relation to consciousness from artificial agents?
Within the context of non-cognitive phenomena, synthetic biology provides a
valuable example of the classes of relevant questions that can be answered. Examples
are the possibility of creating living systems from non-living chemistry, generating
multicellular assemblies, creating synthetic organoids or even artificial immune systems.
Here advanced genetic engineering techniques along with a systems view of biology had
been able to move beyond standard design principles provided by evolution. Examples
of this are new genetic codes with extra genetic letters in the alphabet that have been
designed and successfully inherited [63], synthetic protocells with replicative potential
[86] and even whole synthetic chromosomes that have defined a novel bacterium species
[50]. Ongoing research has also revealed the potential for creating cognitive networks of
interacting microorganisms capable of displaying collective intelligence [85].
Of course, the criteria for consciousness, as stated in sections above, are not even
remotely satisfied by any of these synthetic systems. They either have some limited form
of intelligence or life but not yet both. Nevertheless, there have been some noteworthy
recent developments in these areas. AlphaGo’s feat in beating the top human Go
champion was remarkable for a couple of reasons. Unlike Chess, possible combinations
in Go run into the millions and when played using a timer any brute-force algorithm
trying to scan the entire search space would simply run out of computational capacity or
time. Hence, an efficient pattern recognition algorithm was crucial to the development
of AlphaGo, where using deep reinforcement learning the system was trained on a large
number of games after which it was made to play itself over and over again (this aspect
of playing itself is akin to training via social interactions as described later on) while
reinforcing successful sequence of plays through the weights of its deep neural networks
[82]. Most interestingly, it played counterintuitive moves that shocked the best human
players and the sole game of the series that Lee Sedol, the human champion won out
of five, itself was only possible after he himself adopted a brilliant counterintuitive
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strategy. Thus, AlphaGo demonstrates a form of domain-specific intelligence. In
contrast, biological awareness spans across domains. Moreover, AlphaGo is not equipped
with any form of arousal mechanisms coupled to its computational capabilities.
The same can be said for other state-of-the-art AI systems including deep
convolutional neural networks, or deep recurrent networks. Both these latter
architectures were inspired from Hubel and Weisel’s groundbreaking work on the
coding properties of the visual system, which led to the realization of a hierarchical
processing architecture [48]. Today deep convolutional networks are widely used for
image classification [28] and recurrent neural networks for speech recognition [80], among
countless other applications. The current interest of deep learning has been anticipated
in computational neuroscience using objective functions from which physiologically
plausible perceptual hierarchies can be learnt [103]. Recent developments have advanced
this by virtue of larger data sets and more computational power. For example, there have
been attempts to build biologically-plausible models of learning in the visual cortex using
recurrent neural networks [61]. In summary, deep architectures have made remarkable
progress in domain-specific AI.
However, asking whether a machine can be conscious in exactly the same way that a
human is, is similar to asking whether a submarine can swim. It just does it differently.
If the goal of a system is to learn and solve complex tasks close to human performance
or better, current machines are already doing that in specific domains. However, these
machines are still far from learning and solving problems in generic domains and in
ways that would couple its problem-solving capabilities to its autonomous survival
drives. On the other hand, neither have any of the synthetic life systems discussed
above been used to build architectures with complex computing or cognitive capabilities.
Nevertheless, this does suggest that a future synthesis between artificial life forms and
AI could be evaluated using homologous scales of consciousness to the ones currently
used for biological life forms. This form of synthetic consciousness, if based on a life
form with different survival drives/mechanisms and non-human forms of intelligence or
computation, would also likely lead to non-human behavioral outcomes.
These phenomenological considerations suggest at least two generic types
of complexities to label states of consciousness, those associated to computa-
tional/informational capabilities and those referring to autonomous functioning. In
the following section, we argue for a third complexity type, necessary to build the mor-
phospace of consciousness, namely, social complexity.
4. The Function of Consciousness: Insights from Cognitive Robotics
Based on insights from cognitive robotics, this section takes a functional perspective
on consciousness [6], [7], [43], [68], [95], [96] eventually interpreting it as a game-
theoretic strategy. In [95], it was suggested that rather than being the problem itself,
consciousness might in fact be a solution to the problem of autonomous goal-oriented
action with intentionality, when agents are faced with a multi-agent social environment.
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The latter was formulated as the H5W problem.
4.1. The H5W Problem
What does an agent operating in a social world need to do in order to optimize its
fitness? It needs to perceive the world, to act and, through time, to understand the
consequences of its actions so it can start to reason about its goals and how to achieve
them. This requires building a representation of the world grounded on the agent’s own
sensorimotor history and use that to reason and act. It will witness a scene of agents,
including itself, and objects interacting in various manners, times and places. This
comprises the six fundamental problems that the agent is faced with, together referred
to as the H5W problem [95]: In order to act in the physical world an agent needs to
determine a behavioral procedure to achieve a goal state; that is, it has to answer the
HOW of action. In turn this requires the agent to: (a) Define the motivation for action
in terms of its needs, drives and goals, that is, the WHY of action; (b) Determine
knowledge of objects it needs to act upon and their affordances in the world, pertaining
to the above goals, that is, the WHAT of action; (c) Determine the location of these
objects, the spatial configuration of the task domain and the location of the self, that
is, the WHERE of action; (d) Determine the sequencing and timing of action relative to
dynamics of the world and self, that is, the WHEN of action; and (e) Estimate hidden
mental states of other agents when action requires cooperation or competition, that is,
the WHO of action.
While the first four of the above questions suffices for generating simple goal-
oriented behaviors, the last of the Ws (the WHO) is of particular significance as it
involves intentionality, in the sense of estimating the future course of action of other
agents based on their social behaviors and psychological states. However, because mental
states of other agents that are predictive of their actions are hidden, they can at best
be inferred from incomplete sensory data such as location, posture, vocalizations, social
salience, etc. As a result the acting agent faces the challenge to univocally assess, in a
deluge of sensory data those exteroceptive and interoceptive states that are relevant to
ongoing and future action and therefore has to deal with the ensuing credit assignment
problem in order to optimize its own actions. Furthermore, this results in a reciprocity of
behavioral dynamics, where the agent is now acting on a social and dynamical world that
is in turn acting upon itself. It was proposed in [95] that consciousness is associated to
the ability of an agent to maintain a transient and autonomous memory of the virtualized
agent-environment interaction, that captures the hidden states of the external world,
in particular, the intentional states of other agents and the norms that they implicitly
convey through their actions.
4.2. Social Game Theory
Hence, the function of consciousness is to enable an acting agent to solve its H5W
problem while being engaged in social cooperation and competition with other agents,
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who are trying to solve their own H5W problem in a world with limited resources. This
leads our discussion precisely within the setting of social game theory. In a scenario
with only a small number of other agents, a given agent might use statistical learning
approaches to learn and classify behaviors of the few others agents in that game. For
example, multiple robots interacting to learn naming conventions of perceptual aspects
of the world [87]. Here the multi-agent interaction has to be embodied so that one
agent can interpret which specific perceptual aspect the other agent is referring to (by
pointing at objects) [88].
Another example is the emergence of signaling languages in sender-receiver games
based on replicator dynamics described by David Lewis in 1969 in his seminal work,
Convention [59], [60]. However, in both these examples, strategies that evolutionarily
succeed when only few players are involved, are no longer optimal in the event of an
explosion in the number of players [45]. Likewise in a social environment comprising a
large number of agents trying to solve the H5W problem, machine learning strategies
for reward and punishment valuations may soon become computationally unfeasible for
an agent’s processing capacities and memory storage. Therefore, for a large population
to sustain itself in an evolutionary game involving complex forms of cooperation and
competition would require strategies other than simple machine learning algorithms.
One such strategy involves modeling and inferring intentional states of itself and that
of other agents. Emotion-driven flight or fight responses depend on such intentional
inferences and so do higher-order psychological drives. The mechanisms of consciousness
enable such strategies, whereas, contemporary AI systems such as AlphaGo do not
possess such capabilities.
In summary, interpreting consciousness as a game-theoretic strategy highlights the
role of complex social behaviors inevitable for survival in a multi-agent world. From
an evolutionary standpoint, social behaviors result from generations of cooperation-
competition games, with natural selection filtering out unfavourable strategies.
Presumably, winning strategies were eventually encoded as anatomical mechanisms,
such as emotional responses. The complexity of these behaviors depends on the ability
of an agent to make complex social inferences. This suggests a third dimension in the
morphospace of consciousness (shown in figure 3), namely, social complexity, which
serves as a measure of an agent’s social intelligence.
5. A Morphospace of Consciousness
As evident from our discussions above, consciousness research draws insights from
a variety of disciplines such as clinical neuroscience, synthetic biology, artificial
intelligence, evolutionary biology and cognitive robotics. Taken together, this suggests
at least three complexity types (see figure 2 and table 1) that can be associated
to consciousness: autonomous complexity, computational complexity and social
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CAutonomous CComputational CSocial
Substrate Organism, nervous Cognitive systems Interacting population
system, bots (brains, microprocessors) of agents
Parts Sensors, actuators, Neurons, transistors Individual agents
signalling cascades
Emergence Self-regulated Problem solving Signaling systems,
real-time behavior capabilities language, social norms,
conventions, art,
science, culture
Table 1. The three complexity types along with their respective substrates,
components and emergent properties.
complexity. As a generic definition of a system’s complexity C, we define
C = Isubstrate −
∑
{parts}
Ipart (1)
which is a measure of information generated by the dynamics of a system as a whole
(Isubstrate) minus the sum of that generated by its parts. While this is similar in
spirit to integrated information discussed in an earlier section, it is generically defined
for specifying substrate-specific complexity. This provides a general framework that
includes the possibility of several different types of complexity, among which, CAutonomous,
CComputational and CSocial will be relevant for labelling states of consciousness.
Autonomous complexity CAutonomous measures the complexity of autonomous
actions. In eukaryotes, autonomous action refers to arousal mechanisms resulting
from coordinated nervous system activity; in prokaryotes, autonomous action refers
to reactive behaviours such as chemotaxis, stress responses to temperature, toxins,
mechanical damage, etc., all of these resulting from coordinated cellular signalling
processes; in robotics, autonomous action refers to homeostatic mechanisms driving
reactive behaviors. Therefore, autonomous complexity is the information generated by
the collective dynamics of the complex system driving autonomous actions, over the
information generated by a (hypothetical) uncoordinated copy of this system. On the
other hand, computational complexity CComputational refers to the ability of an agent to
integrate information over space and time across computational or cognitive tasks.
In complex biological systems, this complexity is typically associated to neural
processes, in artificial computational systems, it refers to microprocessor signaling. The
distinction between CComputational and CAutonomous is specified by the tasks that they
refer to, rather than the specific substrate. Finally, social complexity CSocial refers to
the information generated by the population as a whole, during the course of social
interactions, over the information generated additively by individual agents of the
population. Unlike CAutonomous or CComputational, CSocial is not assigned to an individual,
but rather to a specific population (its own species) with which the individual has been
interacting. Nonetheless, as discussed above, these interactions are believed to have
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contributed to the consciousness of an individual on an evolutionary time-scale, by way
of social games. Note that CSocial as defined here, does not refer to group consciousness
(we shall discuss that in the following section).
Autonomous Computational Social
Figure 2. Schematic representation of autonomous, computational and
social complexity. Each complexity measure is illustrated as a whole (the large
circles) constituted of its parts (the inner circles), their interactions (the arrows) and
the emerging properties resulting from these interactions (the inner space within the
large circles, in light grey). Autonomous complexity (left) refers to the collective
phenomena resulting from the interactions between typical components of reactive
behavior such as sensors (illustrated by whiskers in the top inner circle), actuators
(illustrated by a muscle in the bottom-left inner circle) and low-level sensorimotor
coupling (illustrated by a spinal cord in the bottom-right inner circle). Computational
complexity is associated to higher-level cognitive processes such as visual perception
(top inner circle), planning (bottom-left inner circle) or decision making (bottom-right
inner circle). Social complexity is associated to interactions between individuals of a
population, such as a queen ant (top inner circle), a worker ant (bottom-left inner
circle) and a soldier ant (bottom-right inner circle).
Using these definitions for the three types of complexities, we construct the following
morphospace in figure 3. While this space is only a first attempt at constructing
the space of prospective conscious systems, the precise coordinates of various systems
within this morphospace might change due to the rapid pace of new and developing
technologies, but we expect the relative locations of each example to remain the same.
We start with the human brain, which is taken as the benchmark in this space, defining
a limit case located at one upper corner with highest scores on all the three axes.
She/he can perform computational tasks across a variety of domains such as making
logical inference, planning an optimal path in a complex environment or dealing with
recursive problems and hence leads with respect to computational complexity due to
these cross-domain capabilities. On the social axis, human social interactions have
resulted in the emergence of language, music, art, culture or socio-political systems.
Other biological entities such as non-human primates [23], [98] or social insects would
score lower on the social and computational axis than humans. Additionally, other
species of vertebrates such as some types of birds and cephalopods have been shown to
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Figure 3. Morphospace of consciousness. Autonomous, computational and
social complexity constitute the three axes of the consciousness morphospace. Human
consciousness is used as a reference in one corner of the space. Current AI
implementations cluster together in the high computation, low autonomy and low
social complexity regime, while multi-agent cognitive robotics cluster around low
computational, but moderate autonomous and social complexities. Abbreviated
legends: MADeep (multi-agent deep reinforcement system) [89]; TalkH (talking
heads) [88]; DQN (deep Q-learning) [67]; DAC-X (distributed adaptive control) [62],
CoBot (cockroach robot) [42], Kilobot (swarm robot) [79], Subsumption (mobile robot
architecture) [24].
exhibit complex behavior and possess sophisticated nervous systems. These two groups
have actually being enormously useful in the search for animal consciousness [31], [33].
Current AI systems such as IBM Watson [44], AlphaGo [82], DQNs [67] and Siri [2]
are powerful computing systems over a narrow set of domains, but in their current
form they do not show general intelligence, that is, the capacity to independently
interact with the world and successfully perform different tasks in different domains
[58], or as proposed by Allen Newell, the capability with which anything can become a
task [69]. These AI systems are still clustered high on the computational axis, but
lower than humans (due to domain-specificity). Also they score low on autonomy
and social complexity. Synthetic forms of life such as protocells show some levels of
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arousal, reacting to chemicals and stressors, but currently show minimal capabilities for
computation or adaptation and no interactions with other agents [54].
Interest in the field of collective robotics has led to the rise of machines where
emergent macro-properties, e.g. coordination (KiloBot [79], Multi-Agent Deep Network
[89]) or shared semantic conventions (Talking Heads [88]) self-organize out of multi-agent
interactions. These systems are designed to display simple forms of navigation, object-
detection, etc., while interacting with other agents performing the same task. However,
they show lower social and autonomous complexity than most biological agents, and
being embodied, they currently score lower on computational complexity than heavy-
powered AI systems such as IBM Watson and AlphaGo. Notice also that a large region
in the central zone of the morphospace in figure 3 is suspiciously vacant. A similar
observation was made in [72] in the context of the morphospace of synthetic organs
and organoids. In both cases, such an observation points towards new classes of future
machines. In the following section, we discuss two possible manifestations of future
conscious systems.
An important use of the morphospace within evolutionary biology is related to the
actual occupation of this space by the different solutions. In the previous figure it is
possible to appreciate that a large part of the space is empty. Along with the biological
case studies, the set of artificial solutions remain (so far) in a lower part of the cube,
thus indicating the small relevance played by the social context. Social interactions
have instead played a leading role in shaping the minds of the organisms close to the
left wall involving high autonomy and sociality. Here the nature of the social axis
changes among case studies (as well as the underlying computational complexity). But
the filter of evolution has a major impact: social insects are enormously resilient to
many environmental challenges because no individual is more relevant than another.
Redundancy and distributed computation define then as cognitive assemblies. In
contrast, cognitively complex organisms equipped with brains and exhibiting cooperative
behavior have been evolved to live together with others.
6. Other Embodiments of Consciousness
The three dimensional morphospace discussed above provides us with a framework to
also identify other types of complex systems whose levels of computational, autonomous
and social complexity might be sufficient to answer the H5W of consciousness? This
suggests at least two other embodiments of future conscious systems (based on the same
functional criteria as above).
6.1. Group Consciousness
In a sense biological consciousness itself can be thought of as a collective phenomenon
where individual cells making up an organism are themselves not considered to be
conscious (with respect to the three complexity measures defining the morphospace),
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even though the organism as a whole is. But what happens when the system itself is
not localized? We postulate group consciousness as an extension of the above idea to
composite or distributed systems that display levels of computational, autonomous and
social complexity that are sufficient to answer the H5W problem. Note that, as per this
specification of group consciousness, the group itself is treated as one entity. Hence,
social complexity now refers to the interactions of this group with other similar groups.
This bears some resemblance to the notion of collective intelligence, which is a
widely studied phenomenon in complex systems ranging from ant colonies [30], to a
swarm of robots (the Kilobot in [79] and the CoRobot in [42]), to social networks
[38]. But these are generally not regarded as conscious systems. As a whole they are
not considered to be life forms with survival drives that compete or cooperate with
other similar agents. However, these considerations begin to get blurred at least during
transient epochs when collective survival comes under threat. For example, when a
bee colony comes under attack by hornets, collectively it demonstrates a prototypical
survival drive, similar to lower-order organisms. Other examples of such behaviors have
also been studied in the context of group interactions in humans, where social sensitivity,
cooperation and diversity have been shown to correlate with the collective intelligence of
the group [102]. Following this, the notion of collective intentionality has been discussed
in [49]. More recently, [34] have applied integrated information Φ to group interactions,
suggesting a new kind of group consciousness. While it is known that Φ in adapting
agents increases with fitness [32], one can ask a similar question for an entire group: what
processes (evolutionary games, learning, etc.) enable an increase in all three complexity
types for an entire group such that it can solve the H5W problem while cooperating or
competing with other groups?
6.2. Simulated Consciousness
Our discussions on complexity also suggest another type of consciousness, namely,
simulated consciousness, wherein embodied virtual agents in a simulated reality interact
with other virtual agents, while satisfying the complexity bounds that enable them to
answer the H5W questions within the simulation. In this case, consciousness is strictly
confined to the simulated environment. The agents cannot perceive or communicate
with entities outside of the simulation but satisfy all the criteria we have discussed above
within the simulation. How these embodied virtual agents could acquire consciousness
is not yet known. Presumably by evolving across multiple generations of agents that
adapt and learn to optimize fitness conditions. It is also not clear what precise traits
or mechanisms would have to be coded into the simulation (as initializations or priors)
in order to enable consciousness to evolve. The point here is simply that the same
criteria that we have identified with consciousness in biological or synthetic agents in
the physical world, could in principle be admitted by agents within a simulation and
confined to their interactions within that simulation. This has parallels to the notion of
”Machine Consciousness” discussed in [77], which proposes that neural processes leading
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to consciousness might be realizable as a machine simulation (it even goes further to
claim that computer systems might someday be able to emulate consciousness). At
the moment, these are all open challenges in AI and consciousness research. Examples
of studies discussing embodied virtual agents can be found in the work of [27] and
[26]. More recent implementations of embodied virtual agents have been using gaming
technology, such as the Minecraft platform [1], [52].
7. Consciousness and General Intelligence
What do our discussions concerning consciousness have to say about theories of general
intelligence? The idea that consciousness resides in select regions of a morphospace, that
is constructed from function-specific types of complexity, has implications for any theory
of artificial general intelligence. Namely, it suggests a specific decomposition of general
intelligence into complementary types. In psychology, distinct manifestations of human
intelligence have been discussed in the context of Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple
intelligences [35]. Here we want to understand how the dimensions of our morphospace
help group different types of intelligences. This works as follows‡. The autonomous axis
reflects adaptive intelligence found in biological organisms. This encapsulates Gardner’s
kinesthetic, musical and spatial intelligence (some of these also require computational
complexity). The computational axis refers to recognition, planning and decision-
making capabilities that we find in computers as well as in humans. These are tasks
involving logical deduction or inference. Hence, this complexity refers to those types of
intelligences that require computational capabilities, such as logical reasoning, linguistic
intelligence, etc. The third axis of the morphospace, social complexity, relates to social
capabilities required for interacting with other agents. This refers to interpersonal and
introspective intelligence, in Gardner’s terms. These types of intelligences are also
associated to the evolution of language, social conventions and culture. Then there
are also other types of intelligences described in Gardner’s theory such as naturalistic
and pedagogical intelligence, which involve a composition of social and computational
complexity.
As described above, the defining dimensions of our morphospace account for all of
the multiple types of intelligences proposed by Gardner. Taking these intelligence (or
complexity) types into account, while building artificially intelligent machines, elucidates
the wide spectrum of problems that future AI could potentially address. In the light
of both, Gardner’s theory and Newell’s criteria, our morphospace in fact suggests,
that consciousness as we know it, manifests as a specific form of integrated multiple
intelligence. Note that one ought to be careful not to claim that consciousness ’is’
general intelligence. Following William James, in cognitive psychology, consciousness is
rather seen as a process [51]. We claim that this process constitutes mechanisms and
phenomenology that realizes an integration of specific types of intelligences and their
‡ We thank Carlos E. Perez for bringing this point to our attention. A discussion about how Gardner’s
intelligence types may be realized in machines using deep learning can be found in his recent book [74].
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associated complexities in such a way so as to meet survival goals. Intelligence, on the
other hand, can be thought of as a task-specific capability, that by itself is not necessarily
tied to any existential pressures [9]. However, currently we have yet to understand how
many of the intelligence types mentioned above, especially the non-computational ones
[10], can even be realized individually, let alone understanding the mechanisms that
lead to their integration. Nonetheless, given the myriad of recent advances in human-
machine interactions, a complexity-based conceptualization of consciousness provides
a practical and quantitative framework for studying ways in which interactions with
machines might enhance our joint complexities and competences.
8. Societal and Ethical Considerations
No discussion on conscious machines is complete without the very important issue of
ethics. Both, the societal impact and ethical considerations of any form of advanced
machine, especially conscious machines, for obvious reasons, constitutes a very serious
issue. For example, the impact of medical nanobots for removing tumors, attacking
viruses or non-surgical organ reconstruction has the potential to change medicine forever.
Or AI systems to clear pollutants from the atmosphere or the rivers are absolutely
essential for some of the biggest problems that humanity faces. However, as discussed
above, purely increasing the performance of a machine along the computational axis
will not constitute consciousness as along as these capabilities are not accessible by the
system to autonomously regulate or enhance its survival drives. On the other hand,
whenever the latter is indeed made possible, issues of societal interactions of machines
with humans and the ecosystem, becomes an imminent ethical responsibility. It becomes
important to understand the kind of cooperation-competition dynamics that a futuristic
human society will face. Early stages of designing such machines are probably the best
times to regulate their future impact on society. This analogy might not be surprising
to any parent that has a child. Hence, a serious effort towards understanding the
evolution of complex social traits is crucial alongside engineering advances required for
the development of these systems.
9. Discussion
The objective of this article was to bring together diverse ideas from neuroscience, AI,
synthetic biology and robotics, that have recently been converging towards the science
of consciousness. Following progress in these fields, we have attempted to generalize
the applicability of current clinical scales of consciousness to synthetic systems. In
particular, starting from clinical measures of consciousness that calibrate awareness
and wakefulness in patients, we have investigated how contemporary AI systems and
synthetically engineered organisms compare on homologous measures. Awareness
and wakefulness can be abstracted to computational and autonomous complexity
respectively. Additionally, using insights from cognitive robotics, we have discussed
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functions that consciousness serves in nature, and argued that consciousness manifests
as an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy. This made the case for a third type of
complexity necessary to describe consciousness, namely, social complexity. These three
complexity types allow us to represent both, biological and synthetic systems in a
common morphospace.
A morphospace is a useful construct to study systems-level properties of complex
systems based on information-theoretic measures. The three complexity types
comprising the morphospace described here, are representative of biological as well
as synthetic complex systems. Using this morphospace, we have shown how various
biological organisms including bacteria, bees, C. elegans, primates and humans compare
to artificially intelligent systems such as deep networks, multi-agent systems, social
robots, intelligent assistants such as Siri and computational systems as IBM’s Watson.
Besides biological and synthetic consciousness, these considerations also suggest other
possible manifestations of consciousness, namely, group consciousness and simulated
consciousness, each based on distinct embodiment.
In our discussion, social complexity was crucial for constructing the morphospace.
Social interactions play an important role in regulating many cognitive and adaptive
behaviors in both, natural and artificial systems [96]. In [95], it has been suggested that
complex social interactions may have evolutionarily served as a trigger for consciousness.
What is however not known is whether there are specific lower bounds on the scales of
each of the stated complexity types, that an agent must cross in order to attain a
given level of consciousness. Certainly, from developmental biology we know that both
humans (and many higher-order animals) undergo extensive periods of cognitive and
social learning from infancy to maturation. These phases of social and cognitive training
are necessary for development of cognitive abilities leading to levels of consciousness
attained in adulthood.
Even though we may be far from understanding all the engineering principles
required to build conscious machines, a complexity-based comparison between biological
and artificial systems reveals interesting insights. For example, current AI systems
using deep learning tend to cluster along the computational complexity axis of
the morphospace, whereas synthetically engineered life forms group closer along the
autonomous complexity axis. On the other hand, biologically conscious agents are
distributed in regions of the morphospace corresponding to relatively high complexity
along all the three axes (which suggests necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for
consciousness). In terms of Newell’s criteria, excluding those that refer exclusively
to human-specific traits (language, symbolic reasoning), the remainder are completely
satisfied by all agents located in the high complexity region (of all three axes) of the
consciousness morphospace. In contrast, current AI or synthetic systems do not check-
out on this list. Though in 1994 Newell was not explicitly referring to consciousness, it
is remarkable to note how those ideas to formulate theories of cognition and intelligence
seem to reconcile with current ideas of consciousness. One could summarize the crux
of Newell’s criteria as referring to agents displaying autonomous behaviors with cross-
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domain problem-solving capabilities, which can be decomposed to (at least) the three
complexity classes discussed in this paper.
This perspective on consciousness opens several possibilities for future work. For
instance, it may be interesting to further refine the morphospace described here. In
particular, computational complexity itself may involve several sub-types involving
learning, adaptation, acquiring sensorimotor representations, etc, all of which are
relevant for cognitive robotics [97]. Another question arising out of our discussion is
whether the emergence of consciousness in a multi-agent social environment can be
identified as a Nash equilibrium of a cooperation-competition game. In a game where say
two species attain consciousness, the population pay-offs in cooperation and competition
between them are likely to reach one of possible equilibria due to the recursive nature
of intentional inferences, where an agent attempts to infer the inferences of other agents
about its own intentions. Multi-agent models might offer a viable approach to test ideas
such as these.
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